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Judicial review of mergers
Suyong Kim, Anne Vallery, and Deirdre Waters

Abstract

After the significant and much publicised appeals heard by the EC courts in 2002
and early 2003, 2004 has been a quieter year for judicial review of merger cases.
Nevertheless, 2004 has seen judgments and opinions that further develop EC
merger control law, albeit largely on procedural points. On the substantive side,
Advocate General Tizzano delivered his opinion1 in the appeal against the judgment of the Court of First Instance (‘CFI’) in the Tetra Laval case, where he focused on the standard of proof required in Commission merger decisions and the
scope of permissible judicial review of those decisions. The eagerly awaited judgments of the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) in the Tetra Laval case3 and also
of the CFI in GE’s challenge to the GE/Honeywell prohibition4 and in WorldCom/MCI5 will provide further guidance on the scope of judicial review, as well
as on the substantive appraisal of mergers. In the meantime, the Commission has
pressed forward with its overhaul of the EC merger review system. Whilst these
reforms were initiated with the publication of the Green Paper prior to the defeats
sustained by the Commission at the CFI, the need for reform became clear as a
result of the dramatic events of 2002. With the reforms it has now put in place, the
Commission is hoping to address some of the criticisms voiced in recent years.
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After the significant and much publicised appeals heard by the EC
courts in 2002 and early 2003, 2004 has been a quieter year for judicial review of merger cases. Nevertheless, 2004 has seen judgments
and opinions that further develop EC merger control law, albeit
largely on procedural points. On the substantive side, Advocate General Tizzano delivered his opinion1 in the appeal against the judgment of the Court of First Instance (‘CFI’) in the Tetra Laval case2,
where he focused on the standard of proof required in Commission
merger decisions and the scope of permissible judicial review of those
decisions. The eagerly awaited judgments of the European Court of
Justice (‘ECJ’) in the Tetra Laval case3 and also of the CFI in GE’s
challenge to the GE/Honeywell prohibition4 and in WorldCom/MCI5
will provide further guidance on the scope of judicial review, as well
as on the substantive appraisal of mergers. In the meantime, the
Commission has pressed forward with its overhaul of the EC merger
review system. Whilst these reforms were initiated with the publication of the Green Paper prior to the defeats sustained by the Commission at the CFI, the need for reform became clear as a result of
the dramatic events of 2002. With the reforms it has now put in
place, the Commission is hoping to address some of the criticisms
voiced in recent years.
This chapter examines recent EC judicial review cases and the
guidance that they provide on various aspects of merger review,
including the operation of the referral system from the Commission
to national authorities and the standing of third parties to obtain
judicial review of Commission decisions. They also provide important clarification of the Commission’s ability to accept commitments
in phase I cases.

Recent judicial review cases
Rights of third parties—standing to challenge a
merger decision
Prior EC court judgments in this area had established that third parties who are not direct competitors can have standing to challenge a
merger clearance decision. In its 2003 Babyliss judgment6, the CFI
examined whether the Commission’s decision to clear the concentration between SEB and Moulinex was open to challenge by
Babyliss, a third party who had taken part in the Commission’s procedure. The CFI held that Babyliss had standing to challenge the
clearance decision even though it was present in only one of the 13
product categories that were affected by the merger. The CFI noted
that Babyliss was at least a potential competitor for the remaining
twelve product categories, in particular given that, even prior to
entering the retail market, there was competition among suppliers
to be listed with distributors.
The recent ARD v Commission decision7 also concerned a thirdparty challenge and elaborated further on the standing of third parties to challenge merger decisions. In this case ARD, a company
providing free-to-air TV services in Germany, appealed the Com-
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mission’s decision to clear a concentration between Kirch Pay TV
and BSkyB involving the markets for pay TV, digital interactive services and the acquisition of broadcasting rights. The CFI found that
the ‘direct and individual concern’ test could be met by a third party
which was not present on the market that was the subject of a substantive clearance decision and which was not even a potential competitor to the parties. Unlike the Babyliss scenario8, ARD was not
present on any of the markets affected by the decision and could not
be considered as a potential competitor in anything other than a
hypothetical sense. The CFI decided that, where an undertaking’s
monopoly position is strengthened, an action brought by an operator present in a neighbouring upstream or downstream market could
be admissible, particularly where there was evidence of some competition between the markets and the potential for future convergence between them.

Rights of third parties—standing to challenge a
referral decision
The SEB/Moulinex case9 had given rise not only to a challenge of the
Commission’s clearance decision, but also to a challenge regarding
the Commission’s decision to refer part of the merger back to the
French authorities. This latter appeal was brought by Philips Electronics. In its 2003 judgment10, the CFI held that a third party can
be ‘directly and individually concerned’ and thus challenge a decision by the Commission under Article 9(2) of the Merger Regulation to refer a notified concentration to a national authority. The CFI
found that a positive referral decision produces direct and automatic
legal effects on third parties because it removes the possibility for the
proposed concentration to be examined under the Merger Regulation, thereby preventing third parties from availing themselves of the
legal protection conferred upon them by the Treaty. The requirement
for individual concern was met because the partial referral removed
the possibility for those third parties to challenge assessments before
the CFI which they otherwise could have done had the referral not
been made.
In Cableuropa and other v Commission11, the CFI confirmed
these principles in the context of a referral in totality of a concentration by the Commission to a national authority. Cableuropa and
the other applicants had been participants in the procedure regarding the proposed concentration between Sogecable, Canalsatellite
and Via Digital. They had responded to the Commission’s requests
for information and had provided comments on the acceptability of
the proposed concentration. The CFI found that the applicants were
directly concerned by the Commission’s decision to accede to the
request of the Spanish authorities to refer the matter to them. As
regards individual concern, the CFI held that third parties who would
have availed themselves of the right to be heard, had the Commission not referred the case and instead opened phase II proceedings,
would have been individually concerned by a final decision and were
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therefore similarly concerned by the decision to refer the concentration to a national authority.
This case law confirms the extension to the area of mergers of the
more flexible interpretation which prevails in competition law of the
‘directly and individually concerned’ criteria of Article 230 EC (allowing private parties to challenge a Community act), as opposed to the
much stricter interpretation applying under the Plaumann case law.12

Rights of third parties—right to a decision
In September 2003, the ECJ gave judgment in the appeal by Schlüsselverlag JS Moser GmbH (‘Moser’)13 against the CFI’s dismissal of
its action for a declaration under Article 232 EC that the Commission had failed to act by not adopting a decision under the Merger
Regulation regarding a concentration between two Austrian undertakings. The concentration had been approved by the Austrian
authorities in January 2001 and Moser had lodged a complaint with
the Commission in May 2001, claiming that the concentration had
a Community dimension and should have been notified to the Commission. The Commission considered that the concentration did not
meet the thresholds for Community jurisdiction and replied to that
effect to the applicant. Following further discussions concerning the
issue of control over certain of the parties, the Commission informed
the applicant in November 2001 that it still considered that it did
not have competence under the Merger Regulation and so could not
adopt a decision in the matter. The applicant appealed to the CFI,
who dismissed the application as inadmissible.14 The CFI found that
the Commission’s November 2001 letter constituted an act capable
of challenge under Article 230 EC and that there was no failure to
act. In particular, the CFI found that the November 2001 letter
expressed the view of the Commission, even though it was signed
only by the head of the Merger Task Force.
In the appeal, the Commission had argued that it was not, in any
event, under an obligation formally to define its position on the complaint. The ECJ rejected this argument. It held that the Commission
is solely responsible for taking the decisions provided for by the
Merger Regulation (exclusive jurisdiction) and therefore cannot
argue that it is not required to take a decision on the very principle
of its competence under that Regulation. It further held that the
Commission cannot be justified in avoiding “its obligation to undertake, in the interests of sound administration, a thorough and impartial examination of the complaints which are made to it” and to “give
a reasoned response to a complaint that it has specifically failed to
exercise its competence”.
However, the ECJ found that the applicant’s complaint to the
Commission was out of time. It held that, if the Commission could
be required to make a determination on the compatibility of a concentration outside a reasonable period, this would cause the requirements of legal certainty and of continuity of Community action to
be disregarded. Such a possibility would allow third parties to have
the Commission call into question a decision taken by competent
national authorities, even after the exhaustion of possible legal remedies against such a decision in the legal system of the Member State
concerned. In this case, the concentration had been notified to the
Austrian authorities in September 2000 and approved in January
2001. At any time during that period the applicant could have asked
the Commission to examine whether the concentration had a Community dimension. However, it did not do so until May 2001 (four
months following the national clearance). In these circumstances, the
ECJ found that the time period within which the applicant had asked
the Commission to act was not reasonable and that it was therefore
not open to the applicant to bring an action for failure to act.
This case serves as a warning to complainants to ensure that they
do not delay in bringing a complaint to the Commission. It also provides some additional security for complainants that they are entiWWW.GLOBALCOMPETITIONREVIEW.COM

tled to receive a decision from the Commission as long as they comply with the timeliness requirement. In the area of mergers, this judgment is a confirmation of the position already adopted by the
European courts in other areas of competition law, ie Articles 81 and
82 EC cases (eg Automec I15 and II16); state aid cases (eg Sytraval17);
and Article 86 EC cases (eg max.mobil18).

Legitimate interests and jurisdiction of the
Commission
Also important from a procedural perspective, was the judgment of
the ECJ in Portugal v Commission19, concerning the possibility for
Member States under Article 21 of the Merger Regulation to take
measures to protect national legitimate interests. This case concerned
a concentration whereby Secilpar (a Spanish company) together with
Holderbank (a Swiss investment company) proposed to acquire Cimpor-Cimentos de Portugal, a former public undertaking. The proposed acquisition was notified to the Commission for approval under
the Merger Regulation and to the Portuguese Minister for Finance
for authorisation to acquire the voting capital of Cimpor. The Minister refused to provide authorisation, inter alia because the acquisition would have entailed the withdrawal of Cimpor from the
Portuguese capital market and it was incompatible with the Portuguese government’s strategies for restructuring the sector. The Portuguese government sent a copy of its decision to the Commission,
which took the view that the Portuguese government had failed in
its duty under Article 21 of the Merger Regulation to give the Commission prior notice of its intention to disallow a concentration, to
inform the Commission of the interests it was seeking to protect by
that measure, and to allow the Commission to assess the compatibility of those reasons with Article 21. The Commission took a formal decision finding that the reasons of the Portuguese government
for disapproving the proposed acquisition were not compatible with
Article 21 of the Merger Regulation.
This decision was appealed by the Portuguese government. One
plea put forward was that the Commission had no competence to
adopt the contested decision in the absence of any communication
from the Portuguese government concerning the interests protected
by the national measures. The ECJ rejected this plea and held that
the Commission has jurisdiction under Article 21(3) (now Article
21(4), of the Merger Regulation—applicability of national legitimate
interests to notified concentrations), to take a decision that a Member State had acted in contravention of that article, regardless of
whether the Member State had provided the Commission with the
requisite notification of its action. To hold otherwise, according to
the ECJ, would render the article ineffective by giving Member States
the possibility of easily circumventing the controls therein.

Scope of judicial review and the Commission’s
standard of proof
The Advocate General’s opinion in the Tetra Laval appeal20 contains
interesting statements regarding the standard of merger review by
the Commission and subsequent judicial review by the CFI. In particular, as regards the standard of proof required to prohibit a merger,
the Advocate General found that the Commission must not prohibit
a merger unless it is persuaded “on the basis of solid elements gathered in the course of a thorough and painstaking investigation and
having recourse to its technical knowledge” that the notified concentration “would very probably lead” to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. In cases where it is impossible to arrive
at a clear distinct conviction that such a likelihood is greater than
the likelihood that there will be no creation or strengthening of a
dominant position, the merger must be cleared. The Advocate General supported this view by reference to the ability of the Commission and Member States to limit ex post any distortions of
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competition if a dominant position was created or strengthened. He
also referred to the fact that a concentration, which has not been
challenged within the time limits set down in the Merger Regulation,
is automatically deemed to be cleared, so as to avoid unjustifiably
restraining the parties’ freedom of economic activity.
The CFI in Cableuropa21 also dealt with the standard of proof
required in merger reviews, but in relation to the decision to refer a
concentration to a national authority for review.22 Following the position it took in the Philips case23, the CFI held that the conditions for
referral under Article 9(2) of the Merger Regulation are matters of
law and must be interpreted on the basis of objective factors. This
required the EC courts, charged with judicially reviewing a decision
under that article, to carry out “a comprehensive review as to
whether a concentration falls within the scope of Article 9(2)(a)”.
The CFI emphasised that, for Article 9(2)(a)24 to be applicable, two
cumulative conditions must be satisfied: (i) the concentration must
threaten to create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of
which competition will be significantly impeded on a market within
the Member State concerned, and (ii) that market must present all
the characteristics of a relevant market. However, even though the
CFI considered that it must “carry out a comprehensive review” of
whether those conditions are met, it nonetheless did so in the light
of the standard of review set down in Airtours25 namely that, in matters of market definition, the Commission’s findings will stand in the
absence of a “manifest error of assessment”. Therefore, although the
CFI is prepared to carry out a thorough review of Commission referral decisions, it has signalled that it is not willing to subject the Commission to a higher standard of proof than the Commission would
face in relation to the same issues had it retained jurisdiction over a
concentration rather than passing it to a national authority.

Substantive review—commitments
The ARD judgment26 also provided clarification on the important
issue of commitments.27 ARD had taken an active role in the review
of the concentration between Kirch PayTV and BSkyB and was given
the opportunity to review the parties’ proposed commitments and
one revision to those commitments. It challenged the Commission’s
phase I clearance of the concentration, following acceptance of those
commitments. In dismissing ARD’s appeal, the CFI confirmed a number of important points regarding the acceptance of commitments
by the Commission in phase I cases:
■ Prior negative decisions in relation to the same/similar markets
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do not automatically mean that phase I commitments cannot
resolve the competition concerns arising in a given case, as each
merger must be reviewed in the light of its own particular circumstances and impact on the market
■ Commitments that may appear to be purely behavioural but are
aimed at resolving a structural problem (such as undertakings to
allow access to the market by third parties) are capable of remedying the serious competition problems identified
■ As a general matter, commitments go beyond the general monitoring provided for in Article 82 EC because they are imposed
as preconditions for clearance. Therefore, they transfer the burden of proof of compliance to the undertakings concerned and
their breach can lead to revocation of the clearance
■ When reviewing the efficacy of commitments to resolve the identified competition concerns, individual commitments should not
be viewed in isolation but in the overall context of all the commitments undertaken

Conclusion
The EC courts are continuing to influence positively the development
of merger control through their willingness to engage proactively in
the review of Commission decisions, whether decisions to refer concentrations to national authorities or decisions on the substance of
concentrations themselves. In particular, the CFI has been keen to
solidify further the rights of complainants and interested parties to
challenge such decisions before the EC courts. However, whilst the
CFI has demonstrated a continuing willingness to examine challenges
to Commission decisions, it has nonetheless been less critical of Commission decisions than in previous years. For example, it has confirmed a number of principles regarding the acceptance of
commitments in phase I that the Commission will be grateful to have
upheld. It has also made clear that the Commission does not face a
higher standard of review than the ‘manifest error of assessment’
standard in relation to its findings under the referral procedure. At
a time when the Commission is seeking to move forward with its
merger reforms and to put the past criticisms behind it, the judicial
review cases of the past year will surely be welcomed.
Nonetheless, with the judgments from the CFI and ECJ in the
cases concerning Tetra Laval, GE/Honeywell and Worldcom/MCI
expected in the near future, the EC courts are certain to provide further important guidance on substantive issues. The Commission’s
merger reform process will also continue to evolve as those judg-
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ments are given, for example in the development of guidelines on
vertical and conglomerate mergers. The influence of the EC courts
on merger control in the EU is therefore set to continue.
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